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I. INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Code provides the debtor and the bankruptcy trustee with
several devices for recovering property transferred by the debtor. One of these
devices is section 547,1 which allows the trustee to "avoid," or recover,
"preferences," which are certain transfers that benefit one creditor to the
detriment of other creditors. 2 The debtor "prefers" one creditor over another
when the debtor pays one creditor before paying the other. Preferences are
generally permitted outside of bankruptcy; preference law is concerned only
with relationships among creditors within proceedings such as bankruptcy, in
which creditors' rights must be addressed collectively.3 Within bankruptcy, a
transfer is a preference if it satisfies all the requirements of section 547(b), 4-
subject to the seven exceptions of section 547(c).
The smaIl'preference exception, section 547(c)(7), states:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer if, in a case filed by an
individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, the aggregate
value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than
$600.5
* The author is grateful to Professor Nancy Rapoport for her comments on an earlier
draft of this Note.
1 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). All references to section numbers in this Note are to Title
11 of the United States Code.
2 See generally Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in
Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1985).
3 THoMAs H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMTs oFBANKRuPTcY LAW 123-24 (1986).
4 Section 547(b) provides that the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property if the transfer meets all five of these requirements: the transfer (1) was
for the benefit of a creditor; (2) was on account of an antecedent debt; (3) was made while
the debtor was insolvent; (4) was made within the applicable preference period; and (5)
enabled the creditor to receive more than the creditor would receive in a Chapter 7 case. 11
U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
5 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (1988). Section 547(c)(7) would be renumbered (c)(8) under
S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(d)(2).
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Section 547(c)(7) was enacted by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA). 6 The difficulty in analyzing section 547(c)(7)
is due in part to the fact that Congress passed the BAFJA in haste, needing to
enact jurisdictional legislation in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1982 holding
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 7 that the
grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
was unconstitutional. 8 There were no congressional hearings on BAFJA, no
House or Senate report, nor a joint explanatory statement in the conference
report.9 However, small preference exceptions had been considered by
Congress well before 1984, and it is these earlier proposals to which one must
turn to analyze section 547(c)(7).
This Note addresses the issues raised by Bankruptcy Code section
547(c)(7), the small preference exception. Part II examines the rationales for
section 547(c)(7). Part III examines the proposals presented to Congress prior
to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 and the enactment of section
547(c)(7) in 1984. Part IV examines the courts' construction of section
547(c)(7) and criticisms of section 547(c)(7).
II. THE PouciEs oF PREFmR Ec LAW AND
THE RATIONALES FOR SEcTION 547(c)(7)
It is generally accepted that the preference statute in the Bankruptcy Code
has two purposes. The primary purpose is to promote equality in the
distribution of the debtor's assets to the creditors. 10 The secondary purpose is
to prevent creditors from pressuring debtors on the verge of bankruptcy into
making payments.II Ideally, then, the preference exceptions provided in section
547(c) would protect only those transfers that fall within the section 547(b)
6 Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 310(3), 98 Stat. 333, 378 (1984).
7 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality opinion).
8 Lissa Lamkin Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The
Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DuKE L.J. 78, 79 n.1l, 88, 109 & n.143
(1987); 130 CoNG. Rnc. 6284-85 (statement of Rep. Gingrich, criticizing the expeditious
processing of the bill and the degree to which it was influenced by lobbyists).
9 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576, 576 (caption).
10 This has also been called the primary purpose of the bankruptcy system generally.
H.R. RP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6138; Jeffrey W. Morris, Substantive Conswner Bankruptcy Reform in the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 91, 115 (1985); Broome,
supra note 8, at 113 & n.168.
11 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 177, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6138; Morris, supra note 10, at 115; Broome, supra note 8, at 115.
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definition of a preference, but whose avoidance contributes nothing to these
two goals.
Three rationales for a small preference exception, and for section 547(c)(7)
in particular, have been advanced, but all have been criticized for failing to
promote either of the goals of preference law. The first two rationales are based
on the notion that the addition of section 547(c)(7) in 1984 was part of
Congress's response to consumer lenders' complaints that the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 took away too many protections for creditors. 12 The first
rationale is that section 547(c)(7) served to counter the effect of the elimination
of the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement for preferences. 13 Prior to the
1978 Bankruptcy Act, one of the requirements of a preference was that, at the
time of the transfer, the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
was insolvent. 14 This requirement was criticized for three reasons: (1) the
transferee's state of mind is irrelevant when the issue is promoting the equal
distribution policy;15 (2) some considered the reasonable cause to believe
requirement to be excessively protective of creditors because trustees had a
difficult time meeting the burden of proof;16 and (3) some believed the
reasonable cause to believe requirement spawned too much litigation. 17 The
reasonable cause to believe requirement was eliminated by the 1978 Act, but by
1982 consumer lenders had convinced the Senate Judiciary Committee that the
trustee now had too much power to avoid preferences. 18 Thus, the addition of
section 547(c)(7) can be seen as Congress's attempt to balance the competing
interests of the trustee and the good-faith preference transferee.
However successful section 547(c)(7) is at "balancing interests," such a
motive is inconsistent with the two policies of preference law: equality of
distribution among creditors and discouraging creditors from pressuring
12 See Morris, supra note 10, at 94-95.
13 Broome, supra note 8, at 111. The "reasonable cause to believe" requirement was
eliminated as to non-insiders in 1978 and completely eliminated in 1984. Id. at 95-96 &
n.90.
14 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1976) (repealed 1978).
15 Broome, supra note 8, at 94; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 178, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6138.
16 Broome, supra note 8, at 93-94; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 178-79
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6139.
17 Broome, supra note 8, at 93 & n.80; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 178
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6139.
18 ln 1982, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended passage of Senate Bill 2000,
which would have reinstated the reasonable cause to believe requirement: "The committee
recognizes the severe problems that have arisen with preferences, and feels that the burden
has been shifted too far and now unfairly discriminates against the good faith creditor." S.
REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 24 (1982).
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debtors. It is the nature of preference avoidance that the transferee is harmed
for the sake of equal distribution among creditors as a class. To rationalize
section 547(c)(7) as a pro-creditor "balancing of interests" is to say that section
547(c)(7) is more the result of lobbying by consumer lenders than it is a tool
for advancing bankruptcy policy. 19
The second rationale advanced for section 547(c)(7), and the second way in
which its enactment responded to the complaints of consumer lenders, is that
section 547(c)(7) serves as an adjunct to the section 547(c)(2) "ordinary course
of business" exception. To the extent that there might be uncertainty as to
whether section 547(c)(2) applies to a particular consumer debt, section
547(c)(7) protects creditors receiving small preferences. "The addition of
section 547(c)(7) effectively eliminates, in the case of most consumer
payments, the necessity of determining whether the debt was incurred and
payment made in the ordinary course of the financial affairs of the
consumer." 20 Indeed, even without section 547(c)(7), the section 547(c)(2)
ordinary course exception encompasses many consumer debts. 21 This second
rationale, therefore, is concerned with administrative convenience: reducing
litigation over small preferences that appear to have been in the ordinary course
of business. The two policies of preference law are not implicated by this
rationale for section 547(c)(7)'s existence.
The third rationale for section 547(c)(7) is economic efficiency. The
argument is that the small preference exception prevents litigation over
preferences that are usually not worth recovering: preferences of an amount
less than the litigation costs. Further, even if recovery of a preference returns a
net gain to the estate, in most cases the recovery contributes nothing to the
equal distribution policy because liquidation of the estate generates less than
what is needed to pay the priority administrative expenses, leaving nothing for
creditors. 22
19 Countryman, supra note 2, at 816-17; Broome, supra note 8, at 111; Michael J.
Herbert, Bankcard's Revenge: A Critique of the 1984 Conswner Credit Amennents to the
Bankruptcy Code, 19 U. RICH. L. Rnv. 845, 847 n.8 (1985).2 0 Broome, supra note 8, at 122.
2 1 Raymond T. Nimmer, Consumer Bankruptcy Abuse, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
89, 107 (1987) (arguing that § 547 "insulates ordinary-course consumer credit behavior
from [avoidance]. This scheme creates an opportunity for planning through preferential
payment of selected creditors.").
22 S. REP. No. 446, supra note 18, at 24 (1982); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
Hearings Before the Subcorm on Courts of the Senate Conm. on the Judiciary, Part I,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 51, 51, 68-69, 93 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Senate Hearings]
(prepared statement of Claude Rice, Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., and Jonathan M. Landers, all of
whom were serving as consultants to an organization of consumer lenders).
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Two prominent authorities have rejected the economic efficiency rationale.
Judge Cyr argued that the $1,000 cutoff in one particular small preference
exception proposal was unrelated to the costs of litigation because the litigation
may consist of "no more than a mere demand." 23 Professor Countryman
criticized the concept of a small preference exception, arguing that regardless of
whether the equal distribution policy was being advanced, it was inappropriate
for the Bankruptcy Code to favor a preferential transferee over individuals who
were owed administrative costs. 24 Moreover, in the cases in which the estate is
sufficient to pay something to unsecured creditors, the small preference
exception operates to thwart the policy of equal distribution of the estate. If
anything, economic efficiency analysis recommends giving the trustee25
unqualified discretion in deciding when to attack a preference. The trustee is in
the best position to determine when recovery will be efficient because the
trustee, as an officer of the court, owes a fiduciary duty to both the debtor and
the creditors. 26 Because the trustee necessarily internalizes all the costs of
administering the estate, the trustee should decide when to attack a
preference. 27
Thus, all three rationales for the small preference exception are weak. The
next two parts of this Note discuss the ancestors of section 547(c)(7) and how
this provision has been and should be interpreted by the courts.
HLI. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTiON 547(c)(7)
A recommendation for an overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code came in a 1970
report to Congress by the National Bankruptcy Conference. The report
acknowledged suggestions that "smaller transfers made in the ordinary course
of business could be immunized from attack under § 60," but it did not
specifically recommend a small preference exception.28 The National
23 Conrad K. Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive Revision of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 166 n.242 (1975) (criticizing bankruptcy
legislation proposed by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States); see
infra note 32.
2 4 Countryman, supra note 2, at 814 n.525, 815, 817 (calling small preference
exceptions "unjustifiable," "indefensible," and "at war with preference policy").
25 Recovery of preferences by a debtor by way of § 522(h) presents a special issue,
that of the bankruptcy policy protecting debtors' exemptions. See infra part IV.A.
26 Germain v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323, 1330 n.8 (2d Cir. 1993); River
Prod., Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 739 n.16 (5th Cir. 1990).
27 Cyr, supra note 23, at 166 n.242; Countryman, supra note 2, at 814 n.525.
28 NATIONAL BANKRuPTcY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMI=TEE ON
COORDINATION OF TH BANKRUpTCY Acr AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1970),
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Bankruptcy Conference later recommended a $500 small preference
exception.2 9
Debate in Congress about an overhaul of the bankruptcy system was based
on two proposals for replacing the Bankruptcy Code of 1898: one from the
congressionally created Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States and one from the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. 30 The
legislation proposed by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges
contained no small preference exception.31 The Commission's proposed
Bankruptcy Act of 1973 contained a small preference exception of $1,000:
The trustee may not avoid a transfer under this section if the aggregate value of
all property so transferred to a creditor other than a member of the immediate
family, a partner, an affiliate, a director, an officer, or a managing agent of or
for the debtor, is less than $1,000.32
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 204, 209, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6170-71.29 Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings Before the Subconm. on Civi and Constitutional
Rights of the Comm on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, H.R. 31 and H.R. 32,
Appendix, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 333, 362 (1976) [hereinafter Appendix to Hearings]
(proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1975, § 4-607(b)(1), by the National Bankruptcy Conference).
The proposed exception would have covered any
transfer to a creditor other than one who at the date the transfer occurred was a
member of the immediate family, a partner, an affiliate, a director, an officer, or
a managing agent of or for the debtor if the aggregate value of all property so
transferred to that creditor is less than $500.
Id. (mark-up notations omitted). For comments accompanying the proposed exception, see
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Cvil and Constitutional Rights
of the Conm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, Part 3,
94th Cong., 2d Seas. 1835, 1841 (1976) (prepared statement of Leon S. Foreman on behalf
of the National Bankruptcy Conference).
30S. REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5787-88, and in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. 3 (15th ed. 1979)
(also containing a summary of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978). For a line-by-line comparison of the two proposals, see Appendix to Hearings, supra
note 29.
31 Appendix to Hearings, supra note 29, at 177.
32 REPORT OF THE COMMIssION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE UNrrED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 166 (1973) (proposed Bankruptcy Act
of 1973, § 4-607(b)(1)), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. 2 at 166 (15th ed.
1979).
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This is the most pro-creditor proposal that appears in the legislative
history. First, like the current section 547(c)(7), the exception is not
conditioned on either a lack of reasonable cause to believe the debtor was
insolvent or the transfer having been made within the ordinary course of
business. Second, $1,000 was the highest exception amount proposed. In its
commentary accompanying the proposed legislation, the Commission advanced
all three rationales for a small preference exception:
Relatively small preferences do not seriously impinge on the goals of equality
of treatment, avoidance of the grab-bag effect, and prevention of unwise
extension of credit. In addition, the expense of recovery is often
disproportionate to the benefit to creditors.... This exception is also intended
to soften the impact of the Commission's recommendation to abandon the
reasonable cause to believe requirement and to impose a presumption of
insolvency.33
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 contained no small preference
exception. 34
At Senate hearings in 1981,3 5 creditors proposed adding a small preference
exception to section 547(c). One creditor group proposed legislation that
included an exception for any transfer
to the extent that such transfer or transfers involved payments aggregating not
more [than] $750 on a consumer debt or open end credit account, in the
ordinary course of financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee and
according to ordinary business terms, unless the creditor had reasonable cause
to believe the debtor was insolvent.36
The commentary accompanying this proposal claimed the small preference
exception was required because the "ordinary course" exception's forty-five
day requirement was too restrictive in the consumer credit context. 37 This
proposal is based on the second rationale, that the small preference exception is
an adjunct to the ordinary course exception. This proposed exception is
noteworthy for its narrow scope: it would be redundant today because the
forty-five day requirement of the section 547(c)(2) ordinary course exception
33 Id. pt. I, at 206 (footnotes omitted); see also id. pt. II, at 170 n.ll.34 See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2599 (1978).
35 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 22. The hearings concerned Senate Bill 863,
which contained no small preference exception. Id. at 319, 363.36 Id. at 72, 92.
37 Id. at 92-94; see also Countryman, supra note 2, at 814 & n.527 (citing same
hearings).
1994]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
was eliminated by the BAFJA at the same time section 547(c)(7) was enacted.38
The commentary also relies on the third rationale in saying that the equal
distribution policy is not served by recovery of small preferences because small
preferences usually go to pay administration costs, not creditors. 39
During the same 1981 Senate hearings, the American Retail Federation
recommended excepting all payments on consumer debts in the ordinary course
of business, or alternatively at least $750 of such paymentsA° The National
Association of Federal Credit Unions4' and the Credit Union National
Association42 urged Congress to except all ordinary course payments on
consumer installment debt when the creditor did not have reason to know of the
debtor's insolvency. The groups argued that unknowing creditors would not
pressure debtors and that the small amounts involved in such debt payments
made a negligible contribution to the equal distribution policy. By 1982, the
consumer creditors' lobby had convinced the Senate Judiciary Committee that
the trustee's preference power was too great under the 1978 Act.43
A bill introduced in 1983 by Representative Rodino, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, contained an unqualified small preference
exception applicable to all debtors in Chapters 7, 11, or 13 regardless of the
creditor's state of mind or whether the transfer occurred in the ordinary course.
The exception would have protected any transfer
if the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such
transfer-
(A) in a case under chapter 7 or 13 of this title is less than $250; and
(B) in a case under chapter 11 of this title is less than $750.44
The Judiciary Committee did not act on the bill.
In 1984 the language of the current section 547(c)(7) appeared in the
original version of House Bill 5174,45 which was passed by the House on
38 Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378 (1984); see also Countryman,
supra note 2, at 814 & n.528.
39 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 93.
40 Id. at 153, 158 (prepared statement of Bud Grant on behalf of the American Retail
Federation).
41 Id. at 168, 171-72 (prepared statement of Fred M. Haden on behalf of the National
Association of Federal Credit Unions).
42 Id. at 174, 181-82 (prepared statement of Eldon Hoekstra on behalf of the Credit
Union National Association).
43 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
44 H.R. 1147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(3) (1983).
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March 21, 1984.46 Disagreements between the House and Senate resulted in a
modified version of the bill, which did not alter the small preference
exception. 47
To the extent one can say there was an evolution in the development of
section 547(c)(7), it was an evolution to the benefit of creditors, because
section 547(c)(7) provides creditors with more protection than would have been
provided by most of the other proposals Congress considered, the exception
being that of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.48
Section 547(c)(7) protects more than merely payments made in the ordinary
course of the debtor's financial affairs, 49 and it protects transfers even if the
creditor knew that the debtor was insolvent and that bankruptcy was
imminent.50 Although the legislative history indicates that section 547(c)(7) was
designed to benefit consumer creditors, section 547(c)(7) does not protect every
$600 payment on consumer debts. Rather, it protects every $600 transfer,
whether or not it pertains to a consumer debt, made by "an individual whose
debts are primarily consumer debts." 51 The significance, if any, of this
distinction is not apparent from the legislative history or the cases. The
language is identical to that in section 707(b), regarding dismissal of a Chapter
7 case.
Finding cogent reasons in the legislative history upon which to base
decisions in section 547(c)(7) cases is difficult. Few cases have cited legislative
history or even based decisions on the supposed rationales for section
45 H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 210 (1984), reprinted in 130 CONG. REC. 6226,
6235 (1984).
46 130 CONG. REc. 6249 (1984).
47 Broome, supra note 8, at 111. For a detailed analysis of the legislative history of
BAFJA, see id. at 99-112.48 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
49 Morris, supra note 10, at 121. Professor Countryman argues:
With the 1984 elimination of the forty-five day limit in section 547(c)(2), the consumer
credit industry now has it both ways. For all consumer payments of less than $600, the
industry does not have to worry about the "ordinary course of business" limitation in
section 547(c)(2). Moreover, because section 547(c)(7), unlike section 547(c)(2), is not
confined to "payments" but applies to any transfer, consumer creditors now have a
$600 exception from section 547 for all consumer-credit security interests.
Countryman, supra note 2, at 814 (footnotes omitted).
50 Morris, supra note 10, at 121-22.
51 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (1988).
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547(e)(7). 52 Therefore, the best way to analyze section 547(c)(7) cases is in
terms of the two policies of preference law.
IV. ISSUES OF INTERPRETATION
A survey of the cases interpreting section 547(c)(7) raises six issues, each
of which is discussed below.
A. Should Section 547(c) (7) Apply Equally to Thmtees and Debtors Who
Are Attempting to Avoid a Preference?
By itself, section 547(b) allows only the trustee, not the debtor, to recover
preferences. 53 The difference between recovery by the trustee and recovery by
the debtor is that property recovered by the trustee becomes part of the estate to
be distributed to creditors, while property recovered by the debtor pursuant to
an exemption belongs to the debtor free and clear of any claims of creditors or
the trustee. Although debtors in Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 cases can wield most
of the powers of a trustee,54 there is no similar provision empowering Chapter
7 debtors. The Chapter 7 debtor's power to avoid a transfer, preferential or
otherwise, derives from section 522(h) and is limited to the avoidance power of
the trustee.55 Section 522(h) provides:
The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor or recover a setoff to
the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property under subsection
(g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided such transfer, if-
52 CHG Int'l, Inc. v. Barclays Bank (In re CHG Int'l, Inc.), 897 F.2d 1479, 1484 &
n.8 (9th Cir. 1990) (lamenting dearth of legislative history and relying on the rationale that
§ 547(c)(7) was designed as an adjunct to the ordinary course exception); Ragsdale v.
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank (In re Control Elec.), 91 B.R. 1010, 1013-14 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1988) (relying on the "ordinary course" and the "economic efficiency" rationales); Johnson
v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Johnson), 53 B.R. 919, 921 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1985)
(choosing "plain language" interpretation over perceived legislative intent regarding
application of § 547(c)(7) to debtors), adhered to, 57 B.R. 635 (1986).
53 Section 547(b) reads: "The trustee may avoid .... " 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988)
(emphasis added).
54 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1303 (1988).
55 Va v. Colonial Am. Nat'l Bank (In re Via), 107 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1989); Kentucky Fin., Inc. v. Newell (In re Newell), 71 B.R. 672, 674 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1987); Harville v. Morris (In re Harville), 60 B.R. 188, 189 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986);
Johnson, 53 B.R. at 921; Holyfield v. Knopp (In re Holyfield), 50 B.R. 695, 697 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1985).
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(1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section... 547...; and
(2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer.5 6
Section 522(g)(1) provides:
Tlhe debtor may exempt under subsection (b) of this section property that the
trustee recovers... to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such
property under subsection (b) of this section if such property had not been
transferred, if-
(1XA) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the
debtor, and
(B) the debtor did not conceal such property .... 57
In other words, the debtor may recover the property as an exemption if all five
of these conditions are satisfied: (1) the property would be exempt under
section 522(b), (2) the transfer is avoidable, (3) the transfer was involuntary,
(4) the trustee did not attempt to avoid the transfer, and (5) the debtor did not
conceal the property.
Section 522(h) thus produces this undesirable result: property that a debtor
could otherwise recover as exempt under section 522(h) may not be recovered
if the transfer of the property is within the section 547(c)(7) exception. The
reason is that the requirement of section 522(h)(1) is not met: the transfer is not
"avoidable by the trustee under section 547, "58 because the transfer is
protected by the section 547(c)(7) exception. This result is undesirable because
the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start policy includes zealous protection of the
debtor's exemptions. 59
Whatever the legislative intent as perceived by the courts, they have
unanimously-albeit reluctantly-upheld the literal operation of section 522(h)
and prevented debtors from recovering preferences of less than $600.60 In
56 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) (1988).
57 Id. § 522(g).
58 Id. § 522(h)(1).
59 In re Barker, 768 F.2d 191, 196 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Keyworth, 47 B.R. 966, 972
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); Johnson, 53 B.R. at 921. In re Ancira, 5 B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1980).
60 However, debtors have succeeded in getting around the § 547(c)(7) exception by
using § 522(0(1) to recover garnished wages not yet paid to the creditor by the employer.
Section 522()(1) provides that the debtor may avoid a judicial lien to the extent the lien
"impairs" a § 522(b) exemption. Whether wage garnishment creates a lien is a matter of
state law; typically, it does. In re Yetter, 112 B.R. 301, 302 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990);
Holdway v. Duvoisin (In re Holdway), 83 B.R. 510, 513 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988); In
re Keinath, 102 B.R. 699, 702 (Bankr. C.D. MI1. 1986); Harville v. Morris (In re Harville),
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Holyfield v. Knopp (In re Holyfield)61 the court blocked the debtor from
recovering $466 of garnished wages. The court viewed this result as
undesirable because it prevented the debtor from making full use of the
debtor's exemptions, thus hindering the debtor's fresh start.62 Similarly, the
court in Johnson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Johnson)/3 blocked the
debtor from recovering $204 of garnished wages. The court acknowledged the
inconsistency of its action with the fresh start policy and questioned the wisdom
of the expansive language of section 547(c)(7):
Although we think that Congress directed § 547(c)(7) at trustees proceeding
under § 547 rather than debtors asserting exemption rights and proceeding
under § 522(h), the broad language of § 547(c)(7) is clear and applies to all
proceedings under § 547 regardless of who is bringing them and regardless of
whether the property to be recovered will be exempt or not.64
60 B.R. 188, 190 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986), 63 B.R. 371, 372; Johnson, 53 B.R. at 922; 4
COLLmR ON BANKRUPTCY 67.10, at 132-33 (14th ed. 1967). The typical wildcard
exemption allows the debtor to exempt any property up to a certain amount, and the
wildcard exemption may be used as the exemption "impaired" by the wage garnishment. In
re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 1981); Johnson, 53 B.R. at 923. In both Smith Cm
which the debtor used the § 522(d)(5) wildcard) and Johnson (in which the debtor used the
state wildcard), creditors unsuccessfully argued that wildcard exemptions should be applied
only to other property specifically exempted by the exemption statute. Thus, even if the
amount of garnished wages is less than $600, the debtor can recover the wages under
§ 522(f)(1) by asserting that the garnishment is impairing the wildcard exemption.
The courts have addressed this issue in detail. The creditor does not have an
unconditional right to the garnished wages until they are paid or, as in Illinois, until the
court issues a second order, a wage deduction order. Johnson, 53 B.R. at 923. The judicial
lien is extinguished (and § 522(0(1) rendered inapplicable) as to a portion of wages when
those wages are paid to the judgment creditor. Buzzell v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (In re
Buzzell), 56 B.R. 197, 198 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986). However, when a second court order is
required before the garnishee may pay the garnished amount to the garnisher, yet the
garnishee pays before the second court order is issued, the judgment lien on those wages is
not extinguished. Keinath, 102 B.R. at 701. Section 522(f)(1) does not apply to wage
assignments because wage assignment does not create a judicial lien. In re Rosol, 114 B.R.
560,564 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1989).
61 50 B.R. 695 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985).
62 Id. at 697.
63 53 B.R. 919, 921 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1985).
64 Id. (footnote omitted).
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All three of the other cases deciding this issue have followed Holyfield and
Johnson.65 As these court opinions suggest, because of the strong policy to
protect exemptions and because section 522(h) predates section 547(c)(7), it is
doubtful that the drafters of section 547(c)(7) intended to restrict debtors'
exemptions.
Given the unwillingness of the courts to interfere with the literal operation
of section 522(h) in this context, how should the Bankruptcy Code be
modified? The court in Holyfield asserted that Congress probably intended that
section 547(c)(7) should protect only voluntary transfers 66 because section
522(h), by way of section 522(g)(1)(A), allows the debtor to recover only
involuntary transfers. However, reducing the scope of section 547(c)(7) to
protect only voluntary transfers goes too far. Because the sole aim of the
modification would be to protect the debtor's exemption rights, involuntary
transfers should be outside of the section 547(c)(7) exception only when it is
the debtor that is seeking to recover the preference under section 522(h). As to
the trustee's attempt to recover preferences under section 547, there is no
reason for distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary transfers. The
voluntary-involuntary distinction arises from section 522(g)(1), which is
applicable only when it is the debtor who is seeking to recover. 67 Indeed, the
court in Johnson suggested that section 547(c)(7) was intended as a limitation
on trustees only.68 Thus, the better modification to the Bankruptcy Code would
be one that merely prevented creditors from using section 547(c)(7) to protect
an involuntary preference when the debtor seeks to avoid it under section
522(h). The best means of accomplishing this result would be to renumber
section 547(c)(7) as 547(c)(7)(A) and add as section 547(c)(7)(B):
Subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall not apply so as to prevent a debtor
from avoiding a transfer under section 522(h) of this title.
65 McDaniel v. Nationwide (In re McDaniel), 85 B.R. 69, 71 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1988);
Kentucky Fin., Inc. v. Newell (In re Newell), 71 B.R. 672, 674 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987);
Harville v. Morris (In re Harville), 60 B.R. 188, 189-90 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986).
66 Holyfield v. Knopp (In re Holyfield), 50 B.R. 695, 697 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985).
67 Of course, a greater restriction on the section 547(c)(7) exception would advance the
policy of equal distribution of the debtor's assets, but the same could be said about
restricting any of the section 547(c) exceptions. Ray v. Cannon's, Inc. (In re Vickery), 63
B.R. 222, 223 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986).
68 Johnson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Johnson), 53 B.R. 919, 921 n.4 (Bankr.
N.D. IMI. 1985), adhered to, 57 B.R. 635 (1986). However, the court admitted that nowhere
in the legislative history was a distinction explicitly made between recovery by the trustee
and recovery by the debtor. The court said § 547(c)(7) was inspired by Barash v. Public
Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), a consolidated case in which the trustees
recovered several small preferences.
19941
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
B. The Meaning of "Transfer": Single Transfer or Aggregation of
Transfers ?
Section 547(c)(7) provides: "The trustee may not avoid under this section a
transfer if ... the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected
by such transfer is less than $600."69 Section 101(54)70 defines transfer as
"every mode" of disposing of property, but there does not appear to be any
case expressly holding that, as defined under section 101, multiple, discrete
transfers might constitute one transfer. Nevertheless, every court that has
addressed the issue of what constitutes a transfer within the meaning of section
547(c)(7) has interpreted transfer to include all transfers made to a single
creditor during the preference period. 71 Although the early commentators on
section 547(c)(7) questioned whether this "aggregation" interpretation would or
should prevail, it is the better interpretation.
The first court opinion to discuss the aggregation issue in detail came in the
1992 case of In re Bunner,72 in which the court reached the proper result by
unpersuasive reasoning. In Bunner, the debtor sought to recover $1,033, which
had been paid to a creditor in two payments made two months apart, but both
within the ninety-day preference period. Each payment met the section 547(b)
requirements for a preference, but each payment was less than $600. The court
held that the debtor could recover the payments: the two payments fell outside
69 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (1988).
70 This subsection of the Code has been erroneously numbered and probably should be
numbered § 101(58).
71 In re Bunner, 145 B.R. 266, 266-67 (Bankr. C.D. IM. 1992) (allowing the debtor to
recover $1,033, which had been paid to a single creditor in two payments made within the
preference period); Lewis v. State Employees Credit Union (In re Lewis), 116 B.R. 54, 57
(Bankr. D. Md. 1990) (allowing debtor to recover $847 of garnished wages, which had
been paid to a single creditor in three payments, each less than $600, over the course of
seven weeks); In re Irvine, 95 B.R. 464, 465 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1988) (denying debtor
from recovering $680 of garnished wages because each of three creditors received less than
$600). Two other decisions have approved of the aggregation interpretation in dicta. In re
Passmore, 156 B.R. 595, 598 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1993) (citing Bunner with approval but
denying debtor from recovering because payments totaled less than $600); Holdway v.
Duvoisin (In re Holdway), 83 B.R. 510, 515 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (approving of
aggregation interpretation but denying debtor from recovering because payments totaled less
than $600).
The "preference period" is the 90-day or one-year period preceding the bankruptcy.
Under § 547(b)(4), one of the requirements of a preference is that it have been made on or
within 90 days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, or within one year if the creditor
is an insider.
72 145 B.R. 266 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992).
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of the section 547(c)(7) exception because they constituted one transfer within
the meaning of section 547(c)(7), and that transfer was for more than $600.73
The court reasoned that "the plain language of section 547(c)(7) mandates that
both transfers be added together in determining whether the minimum of $600
has been met.... Any other interpretation of the statute would render the
'aggregate' language meaningless." 74
The court's reasoning is incorrect on both counts. The plain language of
section 547(c)(7) is transfer in the singular. Indeed, prior to most of the case
law interpreting section 547(c)(7), commentators, plus one court in dicta,
suggested that the single transfer interpretation was mandated by the language
of section 547(c)(7). 75 Said the court in Ray v. Cannon's, Inc. (In re Vickery):
"The answer is not clear.... [Section 547(c)(7)] appears to be unlimited as to
the total amount of preferential payments that are protected so long as each is
less than $600."76 Moreover, Congress had considered a precise small
preference exception in 1981 that clearly incorporated an aggregation rule: the
Rice-Wiese-Landers proposal excepted preferences "to the extent that such
transfer or transfers involved payments aggregating not more [than] $750. "7 7
Thus, the Bunner court is unconvincing in arguing that the "plain language" of
section 547(c)(7) mandates that transfer include all transfers made during the
preference period.
The court in Bunner is also wrong in arguing that a single transfer
interpretation would render the word "aggregate" in the statute meaningless.
The phrase in section 547(c)(7) is: "the aggregate value of all property that
constitutes.., such transfer." 78 The use of the expansive term "all property"
contemplates a transfer of other than cash, such as other tangible property or a
security interest.79 Aggregate, therefore, should be interpreted as referring to
the aggregation of the cash and noncash components of a transfer, the definition
of which is a separate issue.
Rather than the two reasons offered in Bunner, there are three other
reasons for preferring an "aggregation rule" over a "single transfer"
interpretation of section 547(c)(7). First, a single transfer interpretation would
73 Id. at 266.
74 Id. at 266-67.
75 Morris, supra note 10, at 119-20; Richard F. Duncan, Loan Payments to Secured
Cre&tors as Preferences Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Ameubents, 64 NEB. L. RPv. 83,
87-88 (1985); Ray v. Cannon's, Inc. (In re Vickery), 63 B.R. 222, 224 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1986) (allowing trustee to recover a $957 payment).
76 Ray, 63 B.R. at 224.
77 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 92 (emphasis added).
78 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (1988).
79 Morris, supra note 10, at 119-20.
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violate the second policy of preferences by encouraging creditors to pressure
the debtor: a creditor would pressure a desperate debtor into paying the
creditor in discrete transfers of less than $600 each.80 Furthermore,
discouraging such strategic transfers is consistent with the broad definition
transfer is accorded in the context of preferences. In the 1977 case Katz v. First
National Bank,81 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said that the Bankruptcy
Code's definition of "transfer"
is meant to preclude ingenious methods of circumvention:
All technicality and narrowness of meaning is precluded. The word is
used in its most comprehensive sense, and is intended to include
every means and manner by which property can pass from the
ownership and possession of another, and by which the result
forbidden by the statute may be accomplished. 82
Strategic transfers being within the ambit of "ingenious methods," precedent
supports the aggregation rule interpretation of section 547(c)(7).
The second reason for preferring an aggregation rule is that a single
transfer interpretation could cause the result of a case to turn on the acts of
third parties. When a series of transfers is made to a creditor by a garnishee-
employer pursuant to a wage garnishment order, the garnishee-employer or a
court controls how much in garnished wages accumulates before money is paid
over to the creditor. The single transfer interpretation would thus create the
undesirable situation of the garnishee or the court determining to what extent
otherwise preferential transfers could be recovered. In Bunner, for example,
the debtor's wages had been garnished at the rate of $67 per week, and the
employer had made two payments, each about $520, to the creditor. 83 Pursuant
to Illinois law, each payment was made pursuant to a second court order. The
court adopted the aggregation rule interpretation, so the transfer was $1,040,
outside of the section 547(c)(7) exception. Under a single transfer
interpretation, however, there would have been different results depending on
whether the court had delayed its order two weeks as to either of the payments,
time enough for the garnished funds to accumulate from $520 to more than
$600.
Third, an aggregation rule interpretation of section 547(c)(7) is better
because it decreases its applicability, thereby increasing the avoidability of
80 Id. at 120.
81 568 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
82 Id. at 969 n.4 (quoting Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 444
(1901)).
83 In re Bunner, 145 B.R. 266, 266 (Bankr. C.D. 11. 1992).
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preferences. When the debtor recovers a preference under section 522(h), the
recovery is in the nature of an exemption, and exemptions are favored by
bankruptcy policy.84 Thus, there is a policy argument for interpreting section
547(c)(7) to favor debtors over creditors, if not trustees over creditors, when
determining the scope of section 547(c)(7).
But is it appropriate to categorically deem as one avoidable transfer two
unrelated $300 transfers made up to eighty-nine days apart in the ordinary
course of the debtor's financial affairs? Such transfers are, at the very least,
barely outside the set of preferences Congress intended to protect under section
547(c)(7). In litigating the meaning of "transfer," debtors and trustees have
failed to reduce that set much further. For example, if there are two payments
to the same creditor, less than $600 individually but more than $600 together,
and if only one of the payments falls within the ninety-day preference period,
the payments are not aggregated, and the second payment falls within the
section 547(c)(7) exception.85 Nor does transfer include the aggregation of
transfers made to multiple creditors: each creditor may assert its rights under
section 547(c)(7) fully and independently.86 However, the scope of the
exception is reduced by the holding that the portion of a preferential debt
payment attributable to accrued interest on the debt is part of the same
transfer. 87
C. What Does "Property Affected By" Mean?
The most curious language in section 547(c)(7) is "property affected by":
"The trustee may not avoid.., a transfer ... if ... the aggregate value of all
property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600."88
The origin of this phrase appears to be House Bill 1147, a bankruptcy bill that
never made it out of the Judiciary Committee.8 9 Because both House Bill 1147
and House Bill 5174, which became BAFJA, were sponsored by Judiciary
Committee Chairman Rodino, it is possible that the phrase was casually
incorporated into House Bill 5174 and never considered again.
84 See supra part IV.A.
85 Howes v. Hannibal Clinic (In re Howes), 165 B.R. 270 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994).
86 In re Irvine, 95 B.R. 464, 465 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1988) (denying debtor from
recovering $680 of garnished wages because each of three creditors received less than
$600); In re Figueira, 163 B.R. 192, 195 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993) (dicta).
87 Covey v. Pottery Workers Credit Union (In re Rogers), 127 B.R. 844, 848 (C.D.
MI1. 1989) (denying trustee from recovering a $925 payment, $369 of which was attributable
to accrued interest).
88 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (1988).
89 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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What does it mean to say property "is affected by" the transfer of other
property? It is perhaps a measure of the collective confusion that no reported
case refers to any party alleging property has or has not been affected by the
transfer of other property. The issue has not gone completely unnoticed,
however. In In re Shorts,90 the court questioned whether the amount at stake in
the case should be deemed to be the $325 garnished during the ninety-day
preference period or the total amount that was garnished prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. The court did not rule on the issue, however, and
instead granted the debtor's motion by default.91 Collier presumes that the
phrase "affected by" has no meaning.92
One's inclination is to dismiss the phrase as a redundancy typical of legal
writing. The lack of case law suggests that this dismissal is precisely what
litigants have done. But trustees and debtors may be ignoring a potential boon:
an expansive interpretation of "affected by" would bring a transfer outside of
the section 547(c)(7) exception whenever the trustee or debtor could show that
property worth more than $600 has been affected. A credible basis for giving at
least some meaning to the phrase "affected by" is that Congress considered
several small preference exceptions, 93 yet the phrase appeared in only House
Bill 1147 and House Bill 5174, the bill that was enacted as BAFJA. Given the
difficulty adjudicating when property is affected by a transfer, however, it is
likely that the phrase will continue to be meaningless. Congress should delete it
or define it.
D. Is Section 547(c) (7) Subject to a Different Burden of Proof?
The burden of proof as to preference issues is set forth in section 547(g),
which says that the trustee has the burden of proving avoidability under section
547(b) and that the creditor has the burden of proving an exception under
section 547(c). 94 Nevertheless, the court in McDaniel v. Nationwide (In re
90 63 B.R. 2, 4 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985).
9 1 Id. at 4.
92 "Under section 547(c)(7), there is no preference if the value of the interest
transferred by a debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts is less than $600." 4
COLLIER oNBANKRUirCY 547.15 (15th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
93 See supra part IH.
9 4 Section 547(g) provides:
For the purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of
a transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and the creditor or party in interest
against whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the
nonavoidability of a transfer under subsection (a) of this section.
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McDanieO)95 expressly refused to enforce the burden of proof set forth in
section 547(g) as it applied in a section 547(c)(7) case. In denying the debtor
default judgment even though the creditor had not filed an answer, the court
reasoned that creditors should not be penalized for failing to answer
"complaints [that] evidence a defense under section 547(c)(7)." 96 Because
preferential transfers allowed under section 547(c)(7) are so small, the court
said, "the Congressional decision that small preferences should remain
undisturbed would be undercut by the economic reality that small cases are
often not worth defending." 97 The court said that when the preference is less
than $600, it is the movant trustee or debtor that must adduce evidence that the
debts are not primarily consumer debts. "This procedure does shift the burden
of proof on an affirmative defense to the plaintiff. But the facts required-the
nature of the debtor's debts-should be within the plaintiff's knowledge if the
plaintiff is the debtor, or, if the plaintiff is a trustee, readily ascertainable." 98
Thus, the court refused to enforce the statutory burden of proof based on
the administrative convenience rationale for section 547(c)(7). Even one who
subscribes to this rationale must find some irony in the fact that in this
antidebtor decision the court bluntly refuses to enforce the statute, yet courts
have uniformly adhered to the statute in forbidding debtors to avoid transfers
under section 522(h). 99
E. What Does "Primaily Conswer Debts" Mean?
The section 547(c)(7) exception applies only "in a case filed by an
individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts." 100 Two
questions arise: what is a "consumer debt," and what does "primarily"
mean?10
"Consumer debt" is defined in section 101(8) as "debt incurred by an
individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose."' o "The
definition is adapted from the definition used in various consumer protection
11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988).
95 85 B.R. 69 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
96 Id at71.
97 Id. at 71-72.
98 L at 72.
99 See supra part IV.A.
100 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (1988). It is irrelevant whether the transfer at issue relates to
a consumer debt. THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
16.0417][g], at 16-59 (rev. ed. 1991).
101 See generally 4 COLLIER ONBANKRUPTCY 707.06 (15th ed. 1993).
102 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (1988).
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laws." 103 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Zoig v. Kelly (In re Kelly), °4
held that the purpose of the debt is determinative of whether the debt is a
consumer debt. Consumer debts have been described as all nonbusiness debts
one would ordinarily expect to incur in one's daily affairs.' 05 It has also been
held that a consumer debt must have been acquired primarily to achieve a
personal aim or objective. °6
Perhaps the most interesting case on the bankruptcy definition of consumer
debt is In re White,10 7 in which a bankruptcy court held that a tort judgment
against an individual debtor is not a consumer debt. Because this result appears
to benefit tortfeasors inappropriately by rendering section 547(c)(7)
inapplicable, Congress should change section 547(c)(7) from applying when
"consumer" debts exceed "nonconsumer" debts to applying when "consumer"
debts exceed "business" debts. 108 Such a modification makes sense on its own
terms, but if one rejects the three rationales for section 547(c)(7), one must also
consider whether there is any reason why a small preference exception should
distinguish at all between consumer debtors and business debtors. 10 9
The most significant application of the consumer debt definition in the
context of section 547(c)(7) is to home mortgages. The courts have split on the
issue, but the majority of the cases, both recently and overall, hold that debts
secured by real property may be consumer debts. 110 The minority rule is based
primarily on the legislative history of section 101(8), which states that
"consumer debt does not include a debt to any extent the debt is secured by
real property." 111 However, there is paramount authority in the Bankruptcy
Code itself: sections 524(c)(6)(B) and 524(d)(2) refer to "consumer debt
103 S. REP. No. 989, supra note 30, at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5808.
104 841 F.2d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 1988).
105 In re Walton, 69 B.R. 150, 153 (E.D. Mo. 1986), aft'd, 866 F.2d 981 (8th Cir.
1989).
106 In re White, 49 B.R. 869, 872 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985).
107 Id. at 872-73.
108 Morris, supra note 10, at 118 n.123.
109 The small preference exception proposed by Rep. Rodino's House Bill 1147 would
have applied to both consumer and business debtors. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
110 For a list of cases on both sides of this issue, see In re Johnson, 115 B.R. 159,
161-62 (Bankr. S.D. 111. 1990) (citing with approval ZoIg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d
908, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1988) and holding that consumer debt may be secured by real
property). A recent case holding that debts secured by real property are not consumer debts
is In re Restea, 76 B.R. 728, 734 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987).
111 124 CONG. Mac. 32,393 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
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secured by real property." 112 The majority rule is bad for debtors when it
comes to section 547(c)(7) because the rule increases the likelihood that the
debtor will have "primarily consumer debts," making the section 547(c)(7)
exception available to creditors.
The second issue concerning the meaning of "primarily consumer debts" is
the meaning of "primarily." No court has ruled on the meaning of "primarily"
in a section 547(c)(7) case, but the phrase "primarily consumer debts" also
appears in section 707(b), regc:ding dismissal of a Chapter 7 case, and in
Kelly113 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "primarily" means more
than half of the total dollar amount of debts. However, a bankruptcy court in In
re Restea, a case which also followed the minority rule that consumer debt does
not include debt secured by real property, held that "[w]hat constitutes
'primarily' for Section 707(b) purposes defies precise definition," but also held
that it was more than fifty-three percent.114
F. Does Section 547(c) (7) Protect Only Transfers of Less Than $600, or
Does It Protect $600 of Every Preference Regardless ofAmount?
Both courts that have considered this issue have held that section 547(c)(7)
protects only transfers of less than $600. In Ray v. Cannon's, Inc. (In re
Vickety),115 the court rejected the creditor's argument that section 547(c)(7)
entitled the creditor to keep $599.99 of a $957 preference. The court cited at
least four distinct reasons.
First and most persuasive, if Congress had intended to protect $599.99 of
every such transfer, it would have used the phrase, "to the extent," which is
used in the first five preference exceptions, section 547(c)(1) through (c)(5). 116
Second, the statute as interpreted by the court discourages the trustee from
attempting to avoid preferences so small as to not be justified by the litigation
costs. 117 This "economic efficiency" justification is weak because economic
efficiency is better determined by the trustee or the debtor than by a per se
rule. 118 Third, were the creditor's interpretation to be adopted, the effect would
be to protect transfers of more than $600.119 Because of the litigation costs, the
trustee would be discouraged from attempting to recover preferences
112 Kelly, 841 F.2d at 912.
113 Id. at 913.
114 76 B.R. 728, 734 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987).
115 63 B.R. 222 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986).
116 Id. at223.
117 Id.
1 18 See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
119 Ray, 63 B.R. at 223.
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marginally greater than $600, in effect protecting a transfer of more than
$600.120 Arguments regarding section 547(c)(7) that are based on litigation
costs have been criticized because, with amounts so small at stake, the
preferences are less likely to be contested, and even if they are, simple motions
might suffice.' 21 Fourth, the court speculated that its interpretation "should in
the long run allow more recoveries by trustees and lessen the exception's
adverse impact on the equal-distribution policy. " 122
The same result was reached in Via v. Colonial American National Bank
(In re V'a), 123 in which the court relied on Vickery and the "obvious reading"
and "clear wording" of the statute. 124
V. CONCLUSION
Preference law is based on two policies, equality in the distribution of the
debtor's assets and preventing creditors from pressuring debtors into making
transfers. The legislative history of the small preference exception, section
547(c)(7), reveals little more than this: the statute is more the result of effective
lobbying by consumer lenders than it is the result of an attempt to promote
these preference policies. Congress has left the courts to interpret the statute
using only these twin policies, which the statute itself seemingly ignores.
120 Id.
121 See supra text accompanying note 23.
122 Ray, 63 B.R. at 223.
123 107 B.R. 91, 95 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1989) (denying debtor from recovering a
$779 transfer).
124 Id.; see also Morris, supra note 10, at 120.
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